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EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION
AND RECAPTURE TECHNIQUES FOR
EXPANDED PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE
DAVID E. ERVIN and JAMES B. FITCH*
In the past decade, the focus of public efforts to control land use
has shifted. While ample attention is still being directed to separating
conflicting urban land uses, communities now look to land use planning as a means of directing economic and population growth, and as
a means of preserving or improving environmental quality. Comprehensive plans are being drawn up to control land use in rural areas, to
preserve open space, prime agricultural land, and critical natural
areas. As these trends gain momentum, the cry for compensation
begins to grow. Recapture is also frequently suggested to meet the
need for funding compensation programs.
Why compensation? Certainly, the owners of lands where use has
been restricted by public action have always wanted compensation.
But with traditional zoning regulation as an exercise of the police
power, compensation has been denied. Clearly though, legality is an
issue in the new planning. The fact that there are economic rationales
for compensation is frequently overlooked. These rationales relate to
both equity and efficiency. To some, compensating those who are
hurt by land use planning is a matter of equity, and a matter that is
all the more apt if the windfall gains of the "winners" are recaptured
and used to compensate the wipeout losses of the "losers." Although
less obvious, compensation devices may also improve the economic
efficiency of land use allocation. In other words, it is possible that
the need to compensate may lead to a weighing of the benefits of
proposed land use planning changes against the costs, a necessary
process for attainment of economic efficiency.
"Recapture" refers to taking away windfall gains in land values
which accrue to some landowners as a result of public actions in the
land development process. Like compensation devices, introducing
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the recapture feature into a land use control program has the
potential for either adding to or detracting from overall viability of
the program, again depending upon how recapture affects legality,
equity, and efficiency.
At least three types of compensation-recapture programs have
been enacted or proposed to date. These are transferable development rights (TDR's), zoning by eminent domain (ZED), and zoning
auctions (ZA's). Following some general remarks on legal considerations, we will describe briefly how each of the three programs would
work. They will then be compared and evaluated on the basis of
economic efficiency and equity considerations.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPENSATION

The legal authority for public planning and control of land use,
and for zoning in particular, has traditionally been based on governmental authority to regulate under the police power. In recent years,
however, the expansion in scope of many planning programs to include restrictions on the use of natural areas and open space seems to
have increased the possibility that these measures would be contested
on claims of illegal takings of private property. Taking of private land
by governments is permitted only under the power of eminent domain, and it requires just compensation. Thus, one reason for the
growing interest in compensation devices is that they would help tc
avoid the taking issue.
There is debate as to just how much of an obstacle the taking issue
really poses for expanded land use planning. In their widely cited
study, The Taking Issue, Bosselman, Callies, and Banta adhere to the
theory that land use regulations, ".

.

. if reasonably related to a pub-

lic purpose, can never constitute a taking."' The same authors find,
after reviewing a long list of recent state court decisions, that in fac
the courts have tended to uphold even the most restrictive planning
regulations and thus they tend to reject contentions of taking and
the need for compensation.
What may be legally possible may not be viable for other reasons.
Even though courts have recently upheld many restrictive planning
measures, the very fact that Bosselman, Callies, and Banta are able to
cite so many court disputes is ample proof that the taking issue is
still alive as far as landowners are concerned. 2
Many state and local governments are also reluctant to enact re1. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973).
2. Id. at 212-35.

[anuary 1979]

EXPANDED PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE

trictive planning regulations because of their fear of political
-etaliation.3 In some instances, restrictive legislation may violate
,nany people's sense of equity if extreme shifts in property values
:ccur. Situations like this may also influence the politics of enacting
,uch legislation. Thus, for a number of reasons, interest in compen;atory regulation of land use continues in spite of the contention
hat non-compensatory measures have often been judicially viable.
Sax4 has proposed that legislators and jurists look beyond the
3olice and eminent domain powers in seeking new legal authority
ipon which to base land use legislation. He argues that the current
.aw of taking tends to concentrate on the interests of private rights
ind thus overlooks public rights in interpreting what constitutes
"unjust" takings. This, he notes, results in preventing losses to individual property owners with a resulting shift of burdens to
diffusely held interests, such as those affected by drainage and
erosion from a mining operation, or those dependent upon the
marine resources impaired by a wet-land filling and development
project-to the extent that the courts adopt this perspective, they
deny recognition of extant public rights. 5
With this need to consider "diffusely held" interests in mind, Sax
proposes an economic principle to determine how land use should be
regulated. He argues that ". . . the goal of a system which regulates
property rights should be the maximization of the (net) output of
the entire resource base ... rather than the maintenance of the
profitability of individual parcels of property." 6 This is, in effect, a
proposal that land use be designed for economic efficiency. To bring
this principle into use, Sax asserts that both the legislative and
judicial processes need to become more involved in the consideration
f broadly spread benefits, costs, and interests related to land use,
riot just in the costs which might potentially be imposed on a narrowly defined set of landowners. The need to facilitate private
negotiations among all the parties affected by land use is strongly
3. See, e.g., S. BATIE & B. LONG, LOOKING BEFORE LEAPING: LAND USE
LEGISLATION AND THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3 (1974) (Department of
Agricultural Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute). They indicate that the State
General Assembly's failure to provide means of enforcing their critical areas' laws was the
case where "yielding to the property owners' resistance was apparently the politically
expedient course of action."
4. Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty,and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 140 (1971).

5. Id. at 160.
6. Id. at 172. As Sax acknowledges, this line of reasoning adheres closely to that earlier
proposed by R. H. Coase in his well-known article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L.
Econ. 1 (1960).
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emphasized by Sax. He views this as a process of "conflict accommodation."'
Like Sax, Costonis 8 is concerned with taking into account broader
public as well as private interests in regulating land use. He argues
that regulation based on government police power may be neither
fair to affected landowners, nor politically feasible, whereas full
compensation under the power of eminent domain may be "fiscally
impractical." 9 Consequently, he proposes that government and the
courts recognize a third power, "the accommodation power," based
on fair compensation rather than just compensation. Fair compensation, Costonis proposes, should be based on a standard of reasonable beneficial use rather than on the highest and best use standard
typically used in condemnation actions to determine just compensation under eminent domain. Regulatory measures based on fair
compensation, Costonis believes, would remove the courts from the
uncomfortable position in which they
... must either sustain a noncompensatory measure that imposes

unfair losses on the landowner, or they must invalidate the measure
altogether-thereby forcing government to walk
1 the eminent domain
plank to secure its desired planning outcome. 0
In his opinion, TDR's are one possible means of avoiding this no-win
decision making.
It is clear from the writings of both Sax and Costonis that there is
interest among legal and judicial theorists in pushing beyond the
traditional police versus eminent domain powers controversy in order
to discover new ways to deal with land use control. Sax's work
appears to fall on the side of economic efficiency, whereas Costonis'
has more concern for equity and political viability.
HOW THE ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES WORK

All of the techniques evaluated here are either relatively new
proposals or they have been sparingly applied in the United States. 1'
TDR's have probably received the most attention, both in profes7. Sax, supra note 3, at 172.

8. Costonis, Fair Compensationand the Accommodation Power: Antidotes to the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies,75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975).

9. Id. at 1022.
10. Id. at 1038.
11. Readers interested in a more complete treatment of the histories, structures, and
operations of the TDR and ZED concepts should see D. ERVIN, J. FITCH, R. GODWIN, W.
SHEPARD & H. STOEVENER, LAND USE CONTROL: EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL EFFECTS 103-60 (1977) (hereinafter cited as ERVIN), and the references
cited therein.
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sional literature and from the public at large. They have actually
been instituted in three recent but limited cases, two dealing with the
preservation of historic landmarks in New York and Washington,
D.C., and one instituted for the purpose of preserving open space
near a small town in Vermont.' 2 ZED was first conceived in Kansas
City, Missouri, in 1893, it was covered by enabling legislation in
Minnesota as early as 1915, and it has been instituted on a small scale
in both Kansas City and Minnesota.' 3 However, use of the ZED
approach has not spread. ZA's were proposed by Wiseman' 4 only
recently, and they have not to our knowledge been applied in the
United States.
Transferable Development Rights
The TDR approach to compensation and recapture can take a
variety of forms, depending upon the specific context in which it is
applied and upon the particular type of right involved. When used in
New York City for landmark preservation, for example, owners of
landmark buildings were permitted to sell the rights to build at additional heights (expressed in floor area ratio) to developers of buildings in other areas.' I
Recent proposals have advocated the use of TDR's to control
development on the urban fringe, and it is this use that is of primary
interest here. Owners of land where development is restricted in
order to provide open space and other environnmental amenities,
would be issued "certificates" in lieu of their right to develop. These
certificates, known as TDR's, could then be sold to those wishing to
develop land in areas that have been designated for increased allowable densities. In theory, at least, owners of restricted lands would
thus be compensated from the recapture of windfall profits from
those who are permitted to undertake additional development.
Most proposals for using TDR's to regulate the conversion of land
at the urban fringe have envisioned use of the system in conjunction
with traditional zoning. The zoning plan would specify areas eligible
for further development, the development area, and those lands
12. Id. at 129-60. A number of cases where recent legislation has been proposed but not
enacted are also discussed.
13. Hagman, Zoning by Special Assessment Financed Eminent Domain, 28 U. FLA. L.
REV. 655 (1976).
14. Wiseman, Rezoning by Auction-A New Approach to Land Use Decisions, 1974
UTAH SCI. 86 (hereinafter UTAH SC1.). See also Wiseman, Land Zoning and Zoning
Changes: An Economic Perspective, 12 ROCKY MTN. SOC. SC. J. 59 (1975).
15. Richards, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L. J. 338
(1972).
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where development is restricted-the preservation area. The relative
sizes of the development and preservation areas ultimately have great
bearing on the extent to which compensation and recapture will
actually occur. If the development area is small relative to the size of
the preservation area, or if the demand for additional and higher
density structures in the development area is weak, then the demand
for development rights may be weak. This could result in a feeling by
preservation area landowners who are issued development rights that
they have been undercompensated; i.e., that the price of the TDR's is
too low.
Other factors may be crucial in determining how well the TDR
system functions. These include the number of TDR's actually
issued, the way in which they are distributed, and the rate at which
TDR's may be exchanged for the right to develop at increased
density. Some writers have pointed out that it may be necessary to
"downzone" parcels in the development zone at the time that the
TDR plan is instituted, in order to insure adequate demand for
TDR's." 6 Downzoning could even turn the system of TDR's into a
system which would not recapture windfalls, but rather would create
losses ("wipeouts") for landowners in the development zone. 1 7 To
alter a phrase popularized by Hagman,' 8 TDR's could in fact turn
into a "wipeout for wipeout" device rather than one which promotes
the exchange of windfalls for wipeouts. However, though it is possible to envision a TDR system exchanging windfalls for wipeouts, it
is possible only by undertaking substantial planning to avert such
potential shortcomings.
Zoning by Eminent Domain
The idea of zoning by eminent domain emerged around the turn of
this century when it was not clear whether zoning would be upheld
as a valid application of the police power, or as a taking of private
property which would require compensation." 9 ZED was originally
16. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75
(1973). Downzoning refers to reducing the density which is permitted.
17. ERVIN, supra note 11, at 148-51.
1 8. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA:
PLANNING OUR LAND USE 109 (C. Harris ed. 1974).
19. Hagman, supra note 13, at 665. The ZED concept discussed here is based on the
compensation and recapture scheme developed by Hagman which he terms zoning by special
assessment financed eminent domain (ZSAFED). However, this ZED concept can be differentiated from Hagman's ZSAFED concept in that the means to finance compensation are
not limited only to special assessments. Readers interested in a full discussion of the history,
structure, and operation of the ZSAFED concept should consult Hagman, supra note 12, at
655-70.
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conceived as an eminent domain proceeding to compensate landowners who lost development potential when an exclusive residential
district was formed.2 0 Payment was to be financed by assessing
landowners whose land values increased due to the elimination of
potential incompatible uses, such as multiple family housing. In
modern conception, the scope of ZED has been expanded to include
at least partial compensation and recapture of all land value changes
for properties either negatively or positively affected by zoning
actions.2 In this respect, ZED provides for a much broader coverage
of zoning-related gains and losses than does a TDR system. 2 2
Implementation of a ZED system will require establishing or
designating a public body to identify and measure the wipeouts and
windfalls. It should be noted that more than any other factor, the
accuracy of these identification and measurement processes may
determine the ZED system's ability to achieve land use control objectives. The identification process is complicated by the need to
identify both the direct and indirect effects of zoning actions. Direct
effects are changes in the value of land parcels which result from
changes in the permitted use or density of development for those
parcels. Indirect effects arise when the value of a land parcel changes
due to a change in the zoning regulations for other land parcels. For
example, preserving a large open space area on the urban fringe may
cause a "direct" decrease in the value of the land which is so restricted in use, but it may "indirectly" increase the value of abutting
residential lands and the remaining developable land in the community.
Direct effects from such changes in zoning classification will often
be easier to identify than the indirect effects. Those who suffer
indirect wipeouts can be expected to complain, but those who receive indirect windfalls, such as general rises in land values, can be
expected to deny the receipt of any benefits. Depending on the
proportion of land value gains which are indirect, the financial
solvency of a ZED system could be hampered.
Even if all properties significantly affected by zoning measures can
20. Id. at 656-64.
21. Id. at 665. Hagman suggests that compensation and recapture should be forthcoming
for all governmental actions which affect land values, not just zoning changes. For purposes
of comparability with TDR's and ZA's we will only address effects due to zoning. Notice
also that, as outlined here, compensation under ZED is not a pure eminent domain proceeding since that requires "just" or full compensation based on the "highest and best" use
of the negatively affected land before the zoning action.
22. That is, a TDR system includes compensation and recapture when development
rights are altered whereas the ZED system would adjust land values for properties affected
by zoning actions but which did not necessarily gain or lose development rights.
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be identified, accurate measurement of value changes faces other
problems. Assuming that special assessments are used for both wipeout and windfall measurements (probably based on an extension of
the existing property tax assessment systems), two problem areas
seem pertinent. First, ZED assessments before and after zoning
actions will have to occur over a period of time, the length of which
will depend upon the additional resources devoted to the assessment
system. Factors unrelated to zoning which may influence the
affected land values during the time lag will have to be taken into
account, e.g., inflation. Second, even with immediate assessment, the
values of affected land parcels before and after a zone change may
not prove to be a reliable guide for separating the influence of public
action. It is common for land subject to potential zoning changes to
undergo rapid and large changes in value because of the probabilities
of formal public action being capitalized into buyers' bids and sellers'
offers. 2 3 In addition, with a system of multiple land use controls, a
change in zoning classification may not be the sole action which
triggers benefits or damages." 4
Although identification and measurement of wipeouts under a
ZED system may rely on special assessments, other alternatives exist
for recapturing windfalls, especially the indirect variety, which could
avoid some of the identification and measurement problems listed
above. 2 s One alternative is to impose a tax on the future increases in
assessed land value for those properties identified as potentially
benefiting from a zoning action. 2 6 This type of unearned increment
tax would be an addition to the present property tax structure, and
therefore based on periodical assessments. As with special assessments, the effectiveness of this type of recapture device will depend
upon the accuracy of the assessment system. Setting the rate for this
periodical increment tax would be crucial: an improper rate will not
redress the redistributive effects of land use control and it may
hamper the allocative function of land values.
Another alternative is the development tax: an ad valorem tax that
would be based upon the value of the land when sold for develop23. W. ALONSO, LOCATION AND LAND USE: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
LAND RENT (1964).
24. Hagman, supra note 13, at 666-67.
25. Of course, the existing property tax system will automatically and partially adjust for
land value changes due to zoning actions. The deduction of property tax liabilities in
computing federal taxable income would tend to dampen this effect.
26. Lowenberg, Some Economics of Land Use: Analysis of an Innovative Technique to
Increase Efficiency and Equity in the Land Market 48-65 (1973) (unpublished paper,
U.C.L.A. Law School).
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ment. 17 If the sole criterion for levying the tax is sale for
development, then incentives may be created to devise means to
develop the property without sale, e.g., long-term leases.' 8 To avoid
this possibility, conditions for tax imposition could include both sale
for development and change to increased use intensity. The rate of
the development tax would depend upon the amount of funds necessary to compensate landowners disadvantaged by the zoning action.
The scope of this tax is potentially much narrower than the unearned
increment tax, and therefore it could probably only be applied to
zoning measures such as neighborhood open space areas, which have
narrower benefit distributions.
The foregoing discussion of the structure and operation of a ZED
system is a simplification. There remain a myriad of details to be
considered before implementing such a system. However, with due
attention to major problem areas of identification and measurement,
it seems possible that a ZED system could be constructed to compensate wipeouts and recapture windfalls due to zoning actions.
Zoning Auctions
Zoning auctions have recently been proposed by Wiseman 2 9 as
another means of compensation and recapture. In effect, ZA's are
one means of "selling zoning" as earlier proposed by Clawson. 30 The
ZA technique relies on the use of a competitive bidding process to
ascertain both the extent of the loss which zoning (or a change in
zoning) would cause for some, as well as the magnitude of the
benefits which others would reap.
Interested parties are allowed to vote for or against any zoning or
rezoning proposal by submitting the amount of money they are willing to pay for the change, or the amount they are willing to pay to
prevent it, in the form of a sealed bid to the zoning authority. Unlike
TDR's and ZED, all interested parties in the community are allowed
to bid and thus enter the compensation-recapture process.
If the total bids favoring the change exceed the total bids against,
the zoning (rezoning) proposal is approved and the bids of the opposing bidders are returned, together with an equal amount from the
fund bid by the proponents. This amount represents compensation
27. McMillan, Open Space Preservation in Developing Areas: An Alternative Policy, 50
LAND ECON. 410 (1974).
28. Lowenberg, supra note 26, at 54.
29. UTAH SCI., supra note 13, at 86-9.
30. Clawson, Why Not Sell Zoning and Rezoning? (Legally, That Is), Winter 1966-67
CRY CALIFORNIA 9.
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for the opponents' losses equal to the value which they themselves
placed on the loss. The payment comes from what otherwise would
be gains to the proponents resulting from the zoning change. It is not
clear what would be done with excess funds from the proponents'
bids. Wiseman 3 proposes that these extra funds be retained as
general revenues by the local government after administrative costs
are subtracted. However, the difference could either be returned to
the bidding proponents, it could be split between proponents and
opponents, or it might even be returned to the opponents.
If the sum of the opponents' bids exceeds those of the proponents, then the zoning change is denied. The proponents, having
received no benefits, are returned their bids.3 2 What then happens to
the bids of the opponents? Wiseman makes the following proposal:
The money bid by those who voted for "no change" becomes a fund
that is not available directly to the bidders. Instead, legal title to the
fund would be prorated among the bidders and would become a
"property right" attaching to the bidder's property ... the fund

serves as a base for a "no change" bid in any future rezoning actions
... in the future, bids in favor of rezoning must exceed the amount
of the fund plus anything additional that might be bid...

It is not clear from this proposal what the disposition of funds would
be for bidders who are not landowners. It is evident that all opponents must risk losing their bids, otherwise they will have an
incentive to overbid; i.e., bid higher than what their expected losses
will be if the proponents win. Other questions also arise about retaining the "no change fund" on a standing basis. Would it be subject
to property taxes? What if subsequent zoning proposals contain different provisions or apply to slightly different areas than the initial
proposal? Who then has the authority to say that the existing fund
should or should not be used to oppose the new measure? Wiseman's
proposal only partially answers these questions by noting that, in the

31. UTAH SCI.,supra note 14, at 88.
32. The asymmetric procedures for distributing the bids under the two possible outcomes, i.e., proponents win or opponents win, reveal an implicit but very important assumption. The ZA technique, as explained here, necessarily assumes that the opponents
possess clearly defined and enforceable property rights in the land at issue in the zoning
auction. This assumption of property rights ownership may appropriately apply to rezoning
proposals but may not equally fit other zoning actions for which the rights in question are
not well defined, e.g., zoning land not previously regulated. For zoning auctions of the latter
type, it would seem necessary to have symmetric procedures for allocating the bids-either
the opponents or proponents would receive compensation if they lose. We thank W. Bruce
Shepard for calling this point to our attention.
33. UTAH SCI., supra note 14, at 88.
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future, people who had originally bid as opponents could bid in favor
of a zoning change.
The ZA approach has the apparent advantage of getting around
some of the difficult measurement problems associated with both
TDR's and ZED. No special assessments or property valuations are
required of public agencies. Rather, it is left to the affected individuals to place their own values on the proposed change. However,
if individuals are ill-prepared to calculate the expected impacts of
zoning changes, then this may actually be a disadvantage of the ZA
technique.
Wiseman has correctly anticipated one criticism of the zoning
auction approach; that the approach may place the poor at a disadvantage. The poor are indeed in a weak position to bid their preferences in the auction process. As explored later in our discussion of
equity, however, zoning auctions are really no different from other
compensation-recapture techniques in this respect. All of the available procedures appear to rest on the implicit assumption that the
distribution of wealth which exists prior to any zoning change is an
acceptable starting place for deciding how the benefits and costs of
changes in land use should be measured and distributed. Nevertheless, ZA's constitute a step in the direction urged by Sax and
Costonis of facilitating the involvement of all private interests
affected by land use control decisions.
EFFICIENCY

From the viewpoint of economic efficiency, all of the benefits and
costs of alternative land use allocations-both monetary or market,
and non-monetary or non-market-should be explicitly weighed to
determine which land use pattern is the best. If the benefits of
changing to an alternative exceed the costs, then that alternative is to
be preferred to the present use configuration. The best alternative is
the one for which benefits exceed costs by the greatest amount.
Public Regulation and Efficiency
The market process has been repeatedly criticized as a means of
allocating land resources because many of the effects of land use take
the form of spillovers (externalities) which occur outside the market.
In selling a lot for the construction of a factory, for example, the
landowner takes into account the cost of returns foregone by giving
up current and other alternative uses for the land, but he fails to
account for any costs due to noise or smoke which adjacent land
users may incur. Reducing conflicts between land uses of this nature,
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referred to in economics parlance as "spillovers" or "technological
externalities," had formed the original thrust of zoning. Prohibition
of a spillover-producing activity does not necessarily produce
efficient allocation of resources. 3 4 Returning to the preceding
example, the costs which adjacent land users incur as a result of the
external effects of the factory may be small in comparison to the
benefit or gain which the landowner realizes if he is permitted to sell
land to the factory. In spatially separating land use zones to reduce
incompatible land uses, zoning has not usually been based on a
careful consideration of the relative magnitudes of all benefits and
costs. In fact, the results of empirical studies have suggested that land
values in more restrictively zoned areas are not significantly higher
than those in areas less restrictively zoned.3 ' Thus, while the
prevalence of spillovers in land use probably makes the inefficiency
of market allocation inevitable, there is no reason to suppose that the
prohibition of spillover-creating uses by zoning will lead to more
efficient land use than would exist under market allocation.3 6
In addition to the traditional elimination of incompatible uses,
public control of land use is now viewed as a means of providing such
things as open spaces and preservation of critical natural areas. These
are cases where spillovers from land use may be quite broad and far
reaching, both in terms of the size of the land areas affected and the
number of people involved. Included are areas like scenic open spaces
and marshlands where fish and wildlife breed. These are not private
economic goods but rather public goods in the sense that they are of
joint value to large groups, even to the public as a whole. The
potential benefits of these goods may be so thinly spread across these
groups that the transactions costs of organizing these groups to
effectuate their demands would frequently prevent them from being
provided through private (market) action at anything approaching
optimal levels. 3 However, because of the diffuse nature of such
benefits, and due to the lack of market-related activity through
which to measure them, assessment of their aggregate value is quite
34. Turvey, On Divergences between Social Cost and Private Cost, 30 Economica 309
(1963).
35. This is one means to test the efficiency of zoning. See Reuter, Externalitiesin Urban
Property Markets: An Empirical Test of the Zoning Ordinance of Pittsburgh, 16 J. LAW &
ECON. 313 (1973).
36. See B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972) for a provocative study
which relates to this point. Also, for a parallel discussion in the area of water resource
allocation, see Krutilla, Is PublicIntervention in Water Resource Development Conducive to
Economic Efficiency? 6 NAT. RES. J. 60 (1966).
37. Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 292 (1970).

January 1979]

EXPANDED PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE

difficult3 8 if not impossible. Therefore, it probably would also be
difficult to provide optimal levels through public action, even where
the need for appropriate information is recognized.
Given this background, we now ask if and how compensation and
recapture devices could conceivably alter the efficiency issue. From
an abstract point of view, it appears that they may be of some value
in this regard. Compensation is intended to reimburse those who
incur costs as a result of a change in land use, whereas recapture is
meant to extract the gains from those who benefit. If we were
assured of an exact correspondence between compensation and cost,
on the one hand, and recapture and benefit, on the other, then we
might be able to make some judgments about efficiency. For
example, if we could be sure that compensation was a measure of the
total costs of a proposed change in land use, and if recapture included only part of the total gains or benefits, but it covered
compensation requirements, then we could be sure that the change
would represent an improvement in efficiency over the current use
pattern. Is there such an assurance?
TDR 's, ZED and Efficiency
The three devices under examination here differ in this regard.
Several points merit consideration. It is essential to note that TDR's
and ZED aim to compensate and recapture for the effects of a zoning
change after the change has been decided upon. Unless there is
careful consideration and calculation of the amount of losses that
would require compensation, and of the amount of gains that would
be generated for potential recapture prior to implementing a change,
there is absolutely no assurance that the gains from the change would
exceed the losses. It is quite conceivable, as we suggested earlier, that
either ZED or TDR's could turn out to be "wipeout for wipeout"
rather than "windfall for wipeout" systems unless careful checks are
made prior to implementation of the new zoning action to insure
that losses could be covered by gains.
If these advance checks are made, however, then some assurance
about the efficiency of a proposed land use change could be gained.
38. Take the case of valuing publicly-provided parks and recreation facilities as an
example of a closely related phenomenon. Even after a substantial history of empirical
studies, only rough proxy measurement is possible. See EDWARDS, GIBBS, GUEDRY &
STOEVENER, THE DEMAND FOR NON-UNIQUE OUTDOOR RECREATIONAL SERVICES: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES (1976) (Oregon Agricultural Experiment Station,
Corvallis, Oregon).
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However, making accurate advance calculations of the gains and
losses due to a land use change would probably be very difficult and
expensive. It would involve extensive calculations of expected
changes in assessed values based on detailed estimates of changes in
the supply and demand for land and developed properties. The cost
of these procedures, together with the limits on available information, would undoubtedly preclude truly accurate advance estimates.
Nevertheless, the fact that public decision makers would at least have
to think in these terms and make rough prior calculations to insure
the financial viability of either ZED or TDR's appears to be a factor
which would tend to work in favor of-although it would not
insure-improved economic efficiency in land use planning.
One potentially serious flaw does appear to arise in both the TDR
and ZED approaches in terms of efficiency: both systems operate
under implicit assumptions that all of the gains to be recaptured are
from increases in land values which result from a (publicly regulated)
change in land use, and that all of the losses to be compensated result
from corresponding land value decreases. It may be fallacious to
make these assumptions for at least two reasons. First, some gains
and losses obviously will be reflected in the value of labor and capital
resources which are immobile with respect to the regulated area. For
example, some workers who cannot move from the regulated area
may be denied increased wage levels if a factory that would pay them
higher wages is not allowed to locate in their community. Furthermore, some land value increases may represent captures of consumer
surplus from land users, brought about by the reduction in the
supply of certain land-based goods such as rental housing, due to the
zoning action. This type of value increase to landowners is not a
social benefit at all, but merely a redistribution of social product.
Secondly, the very nature of public goods such as open space and
scenic beauty precludes excluding non-paying consumers from
enjoying the benefits thereof.' 9 In other words, it is not necessary to
buy a piece of land to enjoy these "goods," '4 0 and their full value to
the consuming public is therefore not reflected in land values. Thus,
for at least two reasons land values will never be a perfect measure of
the gains and losses from zoning measures, and therefore TDR's and
ZED will never be perfect mechanisms on efficiency grounds.
39. For a good discussion of the issues pertaining to the role of exclusion in the provision
of public goods, see Demsetz, supra note 37.
40. Admittedly, the purchase of appropriately situated land may lead to fuller enjoyment.
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ZA's and Efficiency
Zoning auctions appear to avoid some of the flaws noted above.
They measure value changes (gains and losses) before a zoning
proposal is approved. In principle, parties in favor of a proposal
would bid an amount which approaches their expected benefits, and
opponents would bid an amount which approaches their anticipated
losses. As mentioned, the proposal would be approved only if these
perceived, and thus bid, benefits exceeded perceived and bid costs:
approval depends upon an a priori test which is a test of efficiency.
Furthermore, owners of resources other than land could make bids,
and thus one of the key difficulties with ZED and TDR's is avoided.
As noted previously, ZA's create a situation in which proponents
are not only unsure of how much opponents will bid, but they are
also unsure of how much other potential beneficiaries will bid, and
thus they will be unsure as to how much they will have to bid to
secure the proposed change. Opponents will understandably face
similar uncertainties. The outcome of such an uncertain gaming
situation is usually quite indeterminate; it is possible that net loss
changes could win approval and that net gain changes could fail to be
approved. There may be some potential for avoiding the undesirable
gaming features of ZA if two modifications were made to the system
proposed by Wiseman. First, if opponents and proponents were
encouraged to meet in separate groups prior to bidding, information
could be shared and some uncertainty could be reduced. 4 ' In some
cases, it may even be possible to work out mutually agreeable bid
sharing formulae. The feasibility of such group activity would of
course depend upon group size and the amount of the costs of participation relative to anticipated benefits of this group activity.
Furthermore, if there are any appreciable differences in group size,
the group with the larger number of members would be at a disadvantage.
The second change to the Wiseman proposal would be some sort
of meeting of group representatives or all interested individuals for
sequential open bidding or bargaining rather than for finalized sealed
bidding. A problem with the group representative approach is that
41. By permitting prior meetings the possibility of collusion among the members of one
or the other of the groups is introduced. However, the actions being contemplated by the
groups would involve "either or" rather than incremental types of decisions. Therefore,
collusion does not appear to be as potentially damaging as it could be in an incremental
(e.g., market) type of decision process. Thus, it seems that the potential value of increased
information from prior meetings would probably outweigh the potential negative effects of
collusion.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

the representatives would have to be given power from a group
consensus to which all members of the group may not agree. Regardless of whether individuals or group representatives participate, the
sequential open bidding should provide a greater possibility of
efficient outcomes, since mistakes of the type described above could
be eliminated through the trial and error of bargaining and uncertainty could be further reduced.
The ZA system inevitably shares one flaw in common with TDR
and ZED in that it will fail to account for the full benefits and costs
of public goods. Beneficiaries will undoubtedly attempt to free ride
on the bids of other beneficiaries, again because exclusion will not be
possible. The free-rider phenomenon will also plague the success of
group bargaining suggested above, especially where group numbers are
4 2
large .
In conclusion, we should note some important aspects of efficiency which have not been explicitly treated. These relate to the
level of administrative costs necessary to implement and operate each
of the compensation-recapture techniques. All of the techniques will
require administrative bureaucratic structures. ZED would probably
entail a sizeable expansion of our current property tax assessment
systems. An expansion of current land use planning bodies may be
required to identify the preservation and development zones, and to
monitor the market for a TDR system. A ZA system would necessitate the formulation of operating procedures and require some
costs of supervision, but it should require fewer public resources than
either ZED or TDR's. In any final evaluation of efficiency, these
administrative costs must be considered.
EQUITY

Even assuming that the benefits of a proposed land use planning
action outweigh the costs, this does not guarantee that the particular
land use allocation is desirable from a general social point of view.
The question of who receives the benefits and who bears the costs is
also vitally important, for it is this pattern of distribution which
determines whether or not the planning measure meets social norms
for equity or fairness.4 3
42. For a description of group behavior as a public good generating phenomena, see M.
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
43. Focus on the allocation of material benefits and costs (i.e., changes in economic
values because of a land use planning action) represents the economist's view of equity.
However, there are other important dimensions of equity which relate to land use planning
techniques. Procedural equity is concerned with due process and equal access to political
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The three compensation-recapture programs can be expected to
have different distributive patterns. Both ZED and TDR's are
designed to have an equitable impact on present landonwers. In
principle, at least, payments are channeled to landowners who
experience land value losses. Hidden in this principle is the assumption that the preregulation distribution of wealth from land ownership is fair and that it is, therefore, desirable to preserve it. It is not
clear, however, that TDR's or ZED can or will actually preserve the
preregulation situation.
The zoning ordinance or action(s) to be implemented with a ZED
or TDR system could actually result in a net loss to landowners. If
the particular zoning program on which either system is based causes
significant amounts of development to be shifted to another region
or planning jurisdiction, then aggregate land value in the regulated
area could actually drop, 4 4 and the drop in value might fall more
heavily on one group than another. Obviously, neither a TDR or
ZED system could fully compensate all of those suffering losses in
this case. The particular method of distribution for TDR's could also
bring about shifts in the relative wealth positions4 I of landowners in
the preservation zone. This would occur, for instance, if distribution
were made proportional to preregulation land values, rather than
proportional to reductions in those land values.4 6
Zoning auctions appear to be capable of dealing with much
broader types of allocative impacts of regulation, not just those
and regulatory procedures. Zoning has traditionally maintained a strong semblance of procedural fairness through open public hearings, variance proceedings, and at times through
referendum votes on zoning proposals. It is also useful to distinguish between individual and
categorical views of equity. The special appeal and variance proceedings of traditional
zoning have been largely aimed at individual hardships whereas attempts to promote equity
through public policy appears to address only rough categories, e.g., families above and
below the poverty line. Finally, the distinction of equity within a category, horizontal
equity, or between categories, vertical equity, should be made. Almost all land use planning
techniques approach equity problems within categories, e.g., landowners. TDR's and ZED
can be largely classified as individual allocative measures within the landowner category. As
such, they should tend to reduce the incentives for breaking the land use plan, a characteristic traditional zoning regulations do not enjoy. ZA's are also individual allocative equity
measures but will extend to both landowner and non-landowner groups, Le., vertical equity,
and may thereby address broader public impacts that will inevitably arise as the scope of
land use control is broadened. For further elaboration of the arguments introduced here, see
ERVIN, et. al., supra note 11, at 19. Comments on the terminology of equity from W.
Bruce Shepard were appreciated.
44. W. Van Vaaren, Distribution of Gains and Losses Resulting from Planning Legislation: The Compensation-Betterment Problem, 50-95 (1976) (School of Agricultural
Economics, U. of Guelph, Ontario, Canada) and ERVIN, et. al., supra note 11, at 103-60.
45. As measured by post-regulation land values plus the value of TDR's and compared to
pre-regulation land values.
46. ERVIN, et. al., supra note 11, at 148-51.
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impacts associated with changes in land values. For example, it is
entirely possible for the outdoorsmen who use a particular area for
hunting and fishing to make bids in favor of having the area zoned
into permanent open space: they need not own land in the area.
Similarly, prospective home renters, or a renter's union, might bid
against the same proposal because of expected housing cost and
rental increases that might occur from having development restricted
to more costly land. If the proponents of use restriction win, then
the renters would be compensated for their loss and the hunters
would pay for their gain. Thus, non-landowning groups who are
either positively or negatively affected by proposed zoning restrictions would, in principle, be accounted for in the zoning auction
process, whereas such groups would not be considered at all for
compensation or recapture under ZED or TDR. Nevertheless, the
zoning auction procedure suffers from an acceptance of status quo
wealth distribution, as noted above for ZED and TDR also. Only
those with sufficient wealth would be in a position to state their
preferences through bidding.
While none of the three procedures provides an adequate means
for dealing with the special hardships which land use control might
cause for the disadvantaged, amendments to the systems which could
remedy this situation can be envisioned. For example, builders who
agree to provide a certain amount of low-rental housing could be
granted permission to build with the purchase of fewer TDR's than
would otherwise be required. Under ZED financed with special
assessment, owners of low-valued homes could be assessed at lower
than average rates or bypassed altogether. With a ZA system, funds in
excess of those required to offset compensation and administrative
requirements could be used to stimulate low-rent or low-income
housing. Such amendments, from an equitable standpoint, could
improve performance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The failure of efforts by direct regulation, i.e., zoning, to satisfactorily achieve traditional land use control objectives is well
understood. The act of assigning varying intensities of permitted
development to land parcels creates incentives for some landowners
to secure changes to more profitable intensities thereby breaking the
plan. Without correcting this basic deficiency, efforts to expand the
objectives of land use control will most probably suffer the same
fate. If the movement toward expanded public control of land use
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continues, then the techniques evaluated here may represent potential improvements over existing direct regulation procedures.
Inclusion of provisions for compensation and recapture may soften
the political backlash from landowners expecting restrictions and
thus allow achievement of control objectives, while also guarding
against inefficient land use allocations and inequitable treatment of
affected landowners.
A final assessment of the relative "superiority" of one compensation-recapture technique over another will have to await more extensive application of each technique. However, some general observations on the implications of the techniques for efficiency and
equity should be summarized.
Despite certain limitations, each technique offers some potential
for moving land use planning actions toward more efficient
outcomes. Compensation and recapture provisions under ZED and
TDR systems would lead to more efficient land use allocations only
if land use planners can accurately estimate the changes in land
values before taking action. Even if the land value changes are accurately estimated, the effects on non-landowners are not included.
A ZA system, on the other hand, will require submission of bids by
all affected parties (landowners and non-landowners) favoring and
opposing the proposed zoning action, and it therefore constitutes a
better mechanism for achieving efficient land use planning actions.
However, the ZA system is not without its disadvantages. It may be
difficult to obtain accurate information, and the distinct possibility
exists that affected parties may resort to gaming strategies (such as
free-riding) since public good attributes are expected to exist.
Nevertheless, one of the main reasons that compensation-recapture
techniques are being proposed stems from concern for the inequities
arising from public land use planning actions. If operated as planned,
each technique would at least partially compensate and recapture the
land value changes due to land use control actions. This could be
seen as a more equitable outcome assuming that the preregulation
distribution of wealth in land ownership is socially desirable. Compensation and recapture under ZED and TDR systems are limited
only to landowners. Zoning auctions possess the potential of also
redressing allocative impacts for non-landowners, and therefore they
appear more desirable on grounds of equity.
Whether a TDR, ZED, or ZA system will actually be implemented
ultimately depends upon their political acceptabilities. The political
acceptability of any of the systems will be a complex function of
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many determinants, a function which will vary considerably among
political jurisdictions and over time. 4 7
Notwithstanding the complexity of predicting political palatability, some general observations about the chances of implementing
any of the techniques can be made. First, it is probably accurate to
assume that the present consideration of the new compensationrecapture techniques has occurred primarily due to the expanded
scope of new land use control objectives. These objectives concern
the quality and quantity of the land-based natural environment. The
important question is whether the environmental land use interest
groups will give political support to any of the techniques to
accomplish their objectives. Environmental groups will most likely
lend support only if they perceive higher net benefits with the new
techniques than under existing land use controls. Therefore, even if a
compensation-recapture technique offers a greater chance of accomplishing the new objectives, the environmental groups may not
offer their support if they also expect to be assessed for a larger share
of the costs of providing the environmental goods and services than
under existing controls.
ZA's and ZED may thus appear less desirable since they propose
to recapture gains from broader publics than TDR's where recapture
is concentrated with landowners in the development zone. ZA's in
particular would require a positive indication of the value of environmental goods and services, a policy which would imply that those
individuals who will benefit most should correspondingly pay the
most.
A second observation concerning political acceptability concerns
the attractiveness of the techniques to political decision makers. Of
course, politicians will probably favor adoption of policies which
allow benefited parties to identify the politicians as the source of
benefits, and which do not allow their identification by the cost
bearers. 4 8 Each of the techniques evaluated here could accurately be
characterized as attempts to improve the identification of benefits as
well as the costs of land use control. As such, politicians may view
the techniques with mixed feelings, especially if windfalls tend to be
recaptured from the politically influential.
The last and perhaps overriding consideration regarding political
acceptability is that introduction and consideration of new control
47. For a discussion of the socio-political constraints on land use policies and factors
affecting the political acceptability of ZED and TDR systems, see ERVIN, Id. at 31-60,
123-27, and 157-59.
48. Id. at 58-9.
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techniques, like TDR's, ZED, or ZA's, represent significant and
unfamiliar changes in land use control policies. All three of the techniques have not been instituted on a broad scale or have only just
recently been proposed.
Political scientists have often described governmental policymaking as an incremental process. 4 9 This process is supported on the
basis that incremental policies require less information to evaluate
and implement, and they have smaller risks of failure. If this is a
reasonable hypothesis for explaining policy decision-making, then
the chances of any of these techniques being implemented should
perhaps be discounted since they represent significant and uncertain
departures from the present land use planning and control process.
Politicians might instead be expected to prefer to limit compensation to cases where landowners suffer severe restrictions, and
they probably would prefer using more general sources of revenue
rather than windfall recapture as a financing source. However,
politicians will likely pay more serious attention to compensation
and recapture devices as new means of public control of land use to
the extent that: (1) the taking issue is still alive and some broader
system of compensation becomes desirable to remove the continued
threat of litigation; (2) the current crunch on general sources of
revenue continues, and; (3) more extensive analysis can reduce uncertainty by clarifying in advance the likely outcomes of alternative
systems.

49. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959).

